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COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES:
THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION
AS AN ANTICOMPETITIVE MECHANISM
DAVID I. WALKER

ABSTRACT
Mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors are a growing
presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes
in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer
to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies rather than the value of
individual companies in isolation, this new reality has led to a concern that
companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership
might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But
what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition?
Some commentators argue that one of the most plausible mechanisms is
executive pay design. The idea is that executive pay at companies in
concentrated industries with high common ownership may be designed to
dampen the incentives of the companies’ managers to compete aggressively with
peer firms.
This Article challenges both the theoretical and empirical bases for this
argument and contends that executive pay design is actually an implausible
mechanism for linking common ownership with reduced competition. For
example, this Article shows that, contrary to the claims of some commentators,
the use of competition-enhancing executive relative performance evaluation as
a compensation tool has increased dramatically in parallel with the increase in
common ownership, exactly the opposite of what one would expect if common
owners sought to dampen competition through pay design.
Despite voicing skepticism regarding a possible association between common
ownership and executive pay design, this Article also offers suggestions for
improving empirical analyses going forward that should help to resolve the
debate. If, however, as this Article argues, executive pay design is an implausible
mechanism, this determination tends to undermine the broader claim that
common ownership dampens interfirm competition.
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INTRODUCTION
An important emerging literature investigates the relationship between
increasing institutional investor ownership of multiple companies within an
industry and competition between these companies. Institutional investor
ownership of U.S. equity securities has skyrocketed over the last several
decades. These investors are currently estimated to hold 70-80% of the shares of
the S&P 500.1 Unsurprisingly, institutional common ownership of companies
within various industries has risen steeply as well. Between 1980 and 2010, the
fraction of U.S. public companies with a 5% institutional shareholder holding of
at least 5% of a competitor company increased from 10% to 60%.2 Neither trend
shows signs of abating.
The theoretical implications for competition are simple: unlike an investor in
a single company, an investor who owns large stakes in competing companies
A, B, and C has an interest in the profitability of the three companies in the
aggregate and may not benefit from intense competition between the three
companies, which could drive down aggregate returns. If the managers of A, B,
and C respond to these common-owner preferences, they will compete less
aggressively. Two recent papers provide evidence of such anticompetitive
effects in the airline and banking industries,3 but the results of these papers and
the broader issues are hotly contested.4
A key question in this debate is: What mechanism would translate the
anticompetitive preferences of common owners into competition-reducing
actions by the managers of the commonly held companies? To a significant
degree, the persuasiveness of the anticompetitive narrative depends on the
identification of a plausible mechanism.
For many commentators, executive pay design is a leading candidate. The
idea is that executive pay arrangements at companies in industries with high
1

See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016)
(citing Neil Stewart, Retail Shareholders: Looking Out for the Little Guy, IR MAG. (May 15,
2012),
https://www.irmagazine.com/shareholder-targeting-id/retail-shareholders-lookingout-little-guy [https://perma.cc/YD5Y-RS4E]); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim,
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21
47757 [https://perma.cc/FNS2-85MM] (finding that institutions held 67% of value of all U.S.
shares in 2010).
2
See Jie (Jack) He & Jiekun Huang, Product Market Competition in a World of CrossOwnership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2674, 2675
(2017).
3
See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of
Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) (airline industry); José Azar, Sahil Raina &
Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252 [https://perma.cc
/WU9E-9HP8] (banking sector).
4
See infra Part I.
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levels of common ownership may be designed to dampen managerial incentives
to compete aggressively with peer firms.5 Empirical papers investigating this
possibility have taken two approaches.
First, a number of papers have investigated whether common ownership is
associated with the use of executive relative performance evaluation (“RPE”).6
As the term suggests, RPE-based compensation rewards executives for company
performance relative to that of peer firms. 7 Since a manager with a strong RPEbased contract can profit by increasing own-firm performance or depressing
peer-firm performance, RPE-based arrangements tend to encourage aggressive
competition between companies and therefore would not be preferred—so the
thinking goes—by investors with large common ownership stakes. In a highly
cited working paper, Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné, and Martin C.
Schmalz (“AEGS”) reported evidence of a negative association between
common ownership and the use of RPE,8 but others have found evidence of a
positive association9 or of no association.10
Second, recognizing that managerial incentives are a function of equity
holdings as well as current compensation arrangements, AEGS have revised
their working paper, replacing RPE measures as their dependent variables with
various measures of the sensitivity of an executive’s wealth to own-firm
performance.11 They predict and find that greater common ownership is

5

See respectively Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top
Management Incentives 1 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 2046, 2016),
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2046.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VMBMYC9] [hereinafter AEGS (2016)]; Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition,
and Top Management Incentives 1 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Fin., Working Paper No.
511/2017, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https://
perma.cc/YU74-AMMG] [hereinafter AEGS (2018)]; Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3,
at 1556-57; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 5.
6
See, e.g., AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 2-3 (describing their model calculating RPE);
Rebecca DeSimone, Stealth Socialism? Common Ownership and Executive Incentives 2 (Oct.
7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Heung Jin Kwon, Executive
Compensation Under Common Ownership 1 (Nov. 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://fmaconferences.org/Boston/ExecutiveCompensationunderCommonOwnership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES7W-FF7G]; Lantian (Max) Liang, Common Ownership and Executive
Compensation 1 (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://acfr.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets
/pdf_file/0008/58085/43082-L-Liang-Common_ownership_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU9EUU5Z].
7
See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 334-39 (1982)
(showing that RPE-based contracts can improve risk sharing).
8
AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 54 (finding negative association between common
ownership and use of RPE); see also Liang, supra note 6, at 5 (same).
9
See Kwon, supra note 6, at 17.
10
See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 13.
11
See generally AEGS (2018), supra note 5.
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associated with lower wealth-to-performance sensitivity, that is, with lowerpowered, or “flatter” incentives that would, they suggest, result in less
competition with peer firms.12
This Article argues that executive pay design is actually not a plausible
mechanism linking common ownership with reduced competition. It argues that
executive pay design is a poor fit from a theoretical or conceptual standpoint,
that the trends in executive pay over the last twenty years are inconsistent with
this narrative, and that the empirical methods used to establish the purported
relationship are flawed in ways that have not been identified by previous
commentators. The analysis proceeds in four main parts.
Part I briefly recaps the evidence and debate concerning the growth of
institutional investor common ownership and the resulting impact on
competition between commonly held companies. This Part also highlights the
key question of the mechanism linking the two and the importance of executive
pay design as a leading mechanism.
Part II considers the possible relationship between common ownership and
the use of RPE. This Part shows that the macro trends run exactly counter to the
idea of executive pay serving as a mechanism for discouraging competition in
industries with high levels of common ownership. If common owners discourage
the use of RPE, one would expect reduced use of RPE over the last several
decades as common ownership has mushroomed, but just the opposite is true.
Prior to 2000, there was very little use of RPE in long-term executive pay
arrangements at U.S. public companies. In the last two decades, use of explicit
RPE has increased dramatically. Part II also offers other reasons to doubt that
the use of RPE is a function of common ownership; for example, specific design
elements of RPE are inconsistent with purported common-owner preferences.
Finally, Part II identifies a serious flaw in the identification of RPE utilized in
the empirical studies that find a negative relationship between common
ownership and use of RPE. In short, the methodology is appropriate for
identifying executive incentives associated with implicit RPE, but not
appropriate for identifying executive incentives associated with explicit RPE,
which now likely dominates.13
Part III turns to the idea that the sensitivity of managerial wealth to own-firm
performance (“WPS”) may be a function of common ownership and considers
the evidence, focusing on three primary critiques. First, the use of lowerpowered incentives to discourage competition seems an unrealistically rough
lever. Lower-powered incentives would not only discourage aggressive
competition, but they would also discourage noncompetitive efforts to increase
profits, such as through industry lobbying. This is both counterintuitive and at
least facially inconsistent with the publicly stated positions of large institutional
12

Id. at 2-4.
As described infra Section II.A, explicit RPE metrics are directly incorporated into
compensation instruments. Implicit RPE arises when discretionary elements of compensation
are adjusted to reflect relative performance.
13
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investors. Second, while compensation committees can easily adjust the level of
RPE in current compensation contracts, their ability to manage WPS over the
short to medium term is much more attenuated. Thus, evidence based on shortterm differences in WPS seems particularly difficult to square with the theory.
Third, it is very difficult to determine WPS associated with the complex
performance share awards that have come to dominate executive pay
arrangements in recent years, and it is unclear whether or how empiricists have
dealt with this problem.
For the reasons discussed in Parts II and III, this Article concludes that
executive pay design is an implausible mechanism for linking common
ownership to anticompetitive behavior. From an empirical perspective, however,
one can only say that such an association has not been convincingly
demonstrated. In the spirit of helping to resolve the question, Part IV offers
several suggestions for improving future empirical work on the possible
association. This Part argues that a focus on RPE is more promising than a focus
on WPS, although WPS should certainly serve as a control; that a convincing
empirical strategy must include both implicit and explicit RPE; and that specific
design features of explicit RPE-based compensation should be incorporated in
future analyses.
This Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the mechanism
question to the broader debate. Commentators relying on executive pay design
as the mechanism linking common ownership to anticompetitive behavior would
be advised to consider other mechanisms. In the meantime, one should be
cautious in advocating regulatory intervention with respect to common
ownership practices.
I.

THE COMMON OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION DEBATE

This Part briefly surveys the growth in institutional common ownership of
U.S. companies, the purported implications for product market competition, and
the evidence. It highlights the debate between commentators who favor
regulatory intervention and those who urge caution. Finally, it homes in on the
key question of the mechanism linking common ownership to anticompetitive
behavior and the prominence of executive pay design as a leading mechanism.
As noted in the Introduction, institutional investor ownership of U.S. equities
has increased dramatically in recent years. This has led to an equally dramatic
increase in the number of cases in which common owners hold large positions
in multiple companies within an industry. Much of the growth in institutional
equity ownership and common ownership is attributable to positions held by
stock market index funds, the most rapidly growing segment of the institutional
investor market.14 The modus operandi of index funds, of course, is to own all

14

See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2019)
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of the companies that the index tracks—that is, all of the companies included in
the S&P 500, the Russell 3000, or whatever index is selected.15 As a result, index
fund families’ common ownership of the leading companies in most industries
is essentially inevitable. According to a recent study, the holdings of the “Big
Three” index fund families—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—taken
together would represent the largest shareholder of 438 of the S&P 500
companies.16
Recent papers by José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu and by Azar,
Sahil Raina, and Schmalz sparked concern about the possible anticompetitive
aspects of increasing common ownership.17 As Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu
explain:
[W]ithin-industry diversification of influential shareholders can lead to less
competition in portfolio firms’ product markets. To see why, imagine an
industry with two equal-sized firms, A and B. Suppose A undercuts B’s
price to attract customers from B and thus gain market share. Depending
on the parameters, firm A may benefit from such a move by selling many
more units of a product at an only slightly reduced price. Variations of this
logic are the basis for many standard models of competition.
However, A’s gain in market share comes at the expense of firm B’s
market share, and average prices in the market are lower. As a result, the
owner of firm B loses more revenue than the owner of firm A gains and
thus the sum of A’s and B’s producer rents falls. This means that an investor
holding equal-sized stakes in both A and B would enjoy greater total (i.e.,
portfolio) profits if the two firms set prices or quantities as if they were two
divisions of a monopoly instead of as two independent firms. We therefore
expect less competition compared to the standard model, to the extent that
shareholders are diversified across natural competitors and portfolio firms
act in their diversified shareholders’ interest.18
In their empirical analyses, these authors find associations between
institutional investor common ownership and reduced competition between
companies in the airline and banking industries.19 Specifically, Azar, Schmalz,
and Tecu find that taking common ownership into account results in market
(manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794 [https://
perma.cc/53S7-N2PS] (noting dramatic increase in assets held by index funds).
15
Id. (manuscript at 11-12).
16
Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017).
17
See Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1558; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note
3, at 15.
18
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1521. The companies whose shares are held by
institutional investors are referred to as “portfolio” companies.
19
Id. at 1513 (airlines); Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 5 (banking).
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concentration within the U.S. airline industry that is ten times larger than the
level presumed to be likely to enhance market power per Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice guidelines.20 And they produce evidence
of a positive association between ticket prices and the degree of common
ownership of airlines serving various routes.21 Azar, Raina, and Schmalz
examine the impact of common ownership and cross-ownership of U.S. banks
and find that, taking these ownership features into account, regional industry
concentration is correlated with bank fees and deposit thresholds.22
These papers have been highly influential, but also controversial. Several
researchers have questioned the strength of the empirical evidence and/or the
theoretical underpinnings. For example, Daniel O’Brien and Keith Waehrer
argue that the regressions in these papers are misspecified in such a way as to
lead to a correlation between common ownership and product prices even if
there is no causal connection.23 More generally, they question the use of the
modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“MHHI”) as the measure of common
ownership in these papers, arguing that the MHHI “does not provide a reliable
prediction of the effects of common ownership” on product prices in
oligopolistic markets.24 Edward Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld argue that managers

20

Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1526.
See id. at 1559 (“[W]e find that airline ticket prices are 3% to 7% higher due to common
ownership . . . .”).
22
See Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 3, at 3. While common ownership refers to an
investor holding shares in competing companies, cross-ownership refers to one company in
an industry holding shares in a competitor. See id. at 2.
23
See Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership: We Know Less than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 732 (2017).
24
Id. at 744; see also Erik P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, Who’s Paying
Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives, J. FIN.
ECON. (forthcoming
2020)
(manuscript
at
3),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165574 [https://perma.cc/3H5M-4AH7] (arguing that MHHI
measure unrealistically assumes that all investors are fully attentive); Jacob Gramlich &
Serafin Grundl, Testing for Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd.
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-029, 2017), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017029pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5AZ-3EC5] (criticizing
use of MHHI and proposing alternative). The MHHI is a generalization of the HHI, which
has long been used in antitrust analysis as a measure of industry concentration. Modifications
introduced by Timothy Bresnahan and Steven Salop and by Daniel O’Brien and Salop take
into account partial ownership and common ownership. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Steven
C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 155, 155 (1986) (“We focus on the impact of the financial interest and management
control strucutre of the venture.”); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects
of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559,
561-62 (2000); see also Menesh S. Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional Investors, and
Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 325-28 (2018) (arguing that whether common ownership
21
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are unlikely to take investor common ownership incentives into account given
the conflicting and constantly changing positions of their institutional
shareholders, including interests in suppliers and customers of these
companies.25
Despite the theoretical and empirical challenges to the banking and airline
papers, a number of legal scholars have concluded that the evidence is
sufficiently clear to warrant regulatory action addressing the adverse effects of
common ownership on competition. Concluding that the “evidence now firmly
establish[es] that high levels of horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets
often has anticompetitive effects,” Einer Elhauge argues that existing U.S. and
E.U. antitrust regulation should be brought to bear.26 Eric Posner, Fiona Scott
Morton, and Glen Weyl propose limiting investors’ aggregate holdings in
oligopolistic industries to 1% of the industry unless investors elect to hold only
a single company within such an industry.27
Other commentators urge caution. Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan note that
while placing limitations on common ownership might be viewed as a “better
safe than sorry” strategy from an antitrust perspective, discouraging common
owners from participating in corporate governance could be costly. 28 Given their
misgivings regarding the evidence and finding the Posner, Scott Morton, and
Weyl proposal unduly severe, Rock and Rubinfeld suggest the creation of an
antitrust safe harbor for institutional investors who limit ownership to 15% of a
given company’s equity, do not have board representation, and engage in only
“normal” corporate governance activities. 29 Obviously, the legal and regulatory
stakes here are very high.30
will actually generate competitive harm in a particular industry depends on a number of
factors and requires case-by-case analysis).
25
See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 230-39 (2018).
26
Einer R. Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal
Shareholding 40 (Jan. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096812
[https://perma.cc/T87Y-7S6P] (suggesting that U.S.’s Sherman and Clayton Acts and E.U.’s
TFEU Article 101 can help regulate anticompetitive horizontal shareholding); see also Fiona
Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127
YALE L.J. 2026, 2047 (2018) (concluding that “Section 7 of the Clayton Act presents a
promising vehicle for combatting the anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding”).
27
See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the
Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (2017).
28
C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common
Ownership, YALE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 52-53), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3210373## [https://perma.cc/W7UR-LKUT].
29
See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 25, at 270-77.
30
To gain a sense of the importance of these questions and this debate, note that the Azar,
Schmalz, and Tecu airline industry paper—which was only recently published in the Journal
of Finance, supra note 3—has been downloaded on SSRN over 12,500 times as of November
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An important question in this debate concerns the mechanism linking the
portfolio-maximizing incentives of institutional investors and the
anticompetitive actions of the managers of particular companies. How would the
managers of these companies be induced to refrain from vigorous competition
with peer firms? Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu suggest a number of potential
mechanisms: common owners may influence portfolio company management
by engaging with them directly, by creating managerial incentive structures that
discourage competition, by electing directors sympathetic to avoiding vigorous
competition, or by doing nothing.31 The final idea is that competing with peer
firms is personally costly for managers. If common owners fail to push managers
to compete, they will tend to refrain from competing and simply enjoy the “quiet
life.”32
Hemphill and Kahan provide numerous reasons to question these and other
proposed mechanisms linking common ownership with reduced competition. 33
They point out that several mechanisms have not been empirically tested and
that others are implausible.34 They are skeptical that common owners would
prefer the adoption of weak managerial incentives as a means of discouraging
competition, but conclude that avoiding the use of relative performance
evaluation at firms in industries with a high degree of common ownership is
more plausible.35 They also conclude that “selective omission,” or passivity, of
common owners in cases in which firm value and portfolio value conflict is
another plausible mechanism.36
In a series of draft papers, AEGS show as a theoretical matter that common
owners could discourage interfirm competition by “failing to offer managerial
compensation that is as performance-sensitive as the compensation provided by
2019. See José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common
Ownership, SSRN (Apr. 22, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2427345 [https://perma.cc/U54U-WND5] (indicating 12,598 downloads as of November 29,
2019).
31
See Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1552-58.
32
Id. at 1552-53.
33
See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 47-49). Hemphill and Kahan also
note the lack of strong incentives on the part of institutional common owners to undertake
costly or risky actions to increase portfolio values. Id. (manuscript at 40). Index-focused
investors, in particular, have traditionally been viewed as passive. See id. (manuscript at 45).
Their economic incentives are to provide investment opportunities that accurately track
indexes at the lowest possible cost. Id. (manuscript at 44-46). As such, some commentators
conclude that these funds are unlikely to invest resources in attempting to shape corporate
policy or governance. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14 (manuscript at 79)
(concluding that “index fund managers have inadequate incentives to engage in stewardship
aimed at enhancing the value of particular companies”).
34
Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 6-8).
35
Id. (manuscript at 21-22).
36
Id. (manuscript at 30-31).
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undiversified owners.”37 They provide empirical evidence indicating that, as
predicted by their theory, companies with a high degree of common ownership
tend to make less use of relative performance evaluation38 and tend to adopt less
high-powered incentives generally.39 Because establishing a plausible
mechanism linking common ownership to reduced competition is a critical step
in the broader debate, it is important to review these claims carefully, and that is
the purpose of the remainder of this Article.
II.

RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMMON OWNERSHIP

This Part considers the theory and evidence linking executive RPE to
common ownership and interfirm competition. It begins by recapping the
theoretical connections. Next, it briefly traces the evolution of executive pay
design over the last thirty years, roughly the period during which common
ownership has become prevalent. The key takeaway is that explicit use of RPE
has increased dramatically in tandem with the growth in common ownership—
exactly the opposite of what one would predict if reduced use of RPE were a
mechanism for translating the anticompetitive preferences of common owners
into reduced competition. Finally, this Part addresses the empirical literature
connecting RPE with common ownership and argues that the evidence of a
negative association supporting the compensation mechanism hypothesis is
unpersuasive. This Part points out a critical shortcoming in the literature: a focus
on an empirical strategy that properly identifies implicit use of RPE but not the
explicit use of RPE, which likely now dominates.
A.

A Primer on RPE

Nobel economics laureate Bengt Holmstrom demonstrated in the 1980s that
executive compensation arrangements could be made more efficient by
employing relative performance measures that would filter out the noise of
industry or market movements over which executives have no control.40 Instead
of basing a bonus solely on a company’s total shareholder return, for instance,
the bonus could be based on the company’s total return relative to the total return
of a select group of peer companies or of a broad group of companies. RPE
metrics both filter out uncontrollable risks (seemingly attractive to executives)
and reduce compensation windfalls associated with general market rises
(seemingly attractive to investors).
RPE-based compensation can either be explicit or implicit. The relative total
shareholder return-based bonus described in the preceding paragraph is an
example of explicit RPE. Relative performance is built into the bonus targets. In
other cases, however, a company’s board might use its discretion to adjust salary

37
38
39
40

AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 2.
See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 28.
See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 3-4.
Holmstrom, supra note 7, at 334-38.
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levels or bonus payouts based in part on the firm’s performance relative to other
companies along any number of metrics. This would be an example of implicit
RPE. All else equal, the introduction of RPE, whether explicit or implicit, but
anticipated, encourages competition with peer firms, since managers can
enhance relative performance by improving own-firm performance or by taking
actions that reduce peer-firm performance.
Of course, all else is not always equal. The selection of the peer group is
critical to the creation of competitive incentives. Consider, for example, two
RPE-based bonus schemes. One is based on shareholder return relative to a
dozen close competitors. The other is based on shareholder return relative to all
of the members of the Russell 3000 index (which includes the dozen peer firms).
In each case, the bonus is a function of the company’s rank among the
benchmarked companies. The first design most pointedly encourages
competition with peer companies, since undermining the performance of one or
more of these dozen firms would materially improve the company’s rank among
the thirteen and thus an executive’s bonus. On the other hand, depressing the
performance of one or more peer firms is unlikely to materially affect the
company’s shareholder return ranking among the Russell 3000 companies, and
thus the latter design is less likely to affect competition between rival firms.
The nature of RPE-based metrics is also important. Schmalz argues that RPE
metrics reflecting company value creation, such as total shareholder return,
encourage product market competition with peer firms, while margin-based
metrics actually discourage such competition.41 For example, a company might
increase its relative profits and returns by increasing output and market share,
but in order to maximize margins relative to its peers, a company would tend to
restrict its output.42 All else equal, common owners would prefer that their
portfolio companies restrict output and push up prices. So it is feasible that
companies might embrace RPE while selecting metrics that do not encourage
fierce product market competition between commonly owned peer firms.
B.

The Use of RPE in Executive Pay Contracts

Prior to the mid-2000s, RPE played a relatively insignificant role in U.S.
public company executive pay arrangements. 43 This situation changed
dramatically in the mid- to late-2000s and 2010s as performance awards, often
including explicit RPE metrics, supplanted stock options as the dominant equity
41

See Martin Schmalz, Presentation at FTC Hearing #8 on Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century: Competitive Harm from Common Ownership: Common
Ownership Theories, Governance “Mechanisms” & Policy 63 (Dec. 6, 2018).
42
See id.
43
See David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating
Performance-Based Executive Pay, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 395, 399 (2016) (“Conventional stock
options, and to a lesser extent restricted stock, reigned supreme during the early years of the
equity pay era.”).
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pay instrument.44 RPE is undoubtedly a larger feature of executive pay design
today than ever before. This Section briefly describes these executive pay trends
and their implications for both implicit and explicit RPE.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed explosive growth in U.S. public company
executive pay45 and a transformative shift away from an emphasis on salary and
short-term, accounting-based incentives in favor of longer-term, equity-based
pay.46 In part, this transformation was a response to criticism from economists,
such as Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, who chided companies for providing
insufficient performance-based incentives and paying executives like
“bureaucrats.”47 However, tax and accounting rules played major roles as well. 48
The new equity-based compensation consisted primarily of stock options that
rewarded executives for increases in their companies’ share prices and, to a
lesser extent, time-vested restricted stock grants that provided shares to
executives who remained with their companies for the typical three- or four-year
vesting period.49 By 2000, 70% of senior executive pay at 350 large U.S.
44

See id. at 405-08 (detailing rise of RPE compensation in 2000s).
The average compensation of the CEOs of large U.S. public companies increased in real
terms (adjusting for inflation) by 500% or more between 1975 and 2000. See Xavier Gabaix
& Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 51 (2008);
see also Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a
Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 (2010).
46
Frydman & Saks, supra note 45, at 2107.
47
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO
Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138,
138.
48
Prior to 2006, U.S. financial accounting rules strongly favored the use of the
conventional, at-the-money stock options that are described in the following note over other
forms of pay. Unlike all other forms of pay, companies were not required to recognize on their
financial statements any compensation expense for these options at any time. See David I.
Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232, 238 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett M. McDonnell eds., 2012). In addition, a tax rule enacted in 1993, I.R.C. § 162(m),
limited corporate tax deductions for senior executive pay to $1 million per executive per year
but made an exception for performance-based pay, which included these stock options. See
id. at 239. It is generally believed that § 162(m) contributed to the dramatic increase in the
use of stock options and other forms of performance-based executive pay in the 1990s. See
Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 877, 906 (2007) (“The enactment of § 162(m) provides an excuse for the
colluding parties to engage in significant restructuring of compensation arrangements all in
the name of preserving corporate deductions.”).
49
Stock options provide the holder with a right, but no obligation, to purchase shares at a
predetermined exercise price. Conventional compensatory stock options have a fixed exercise
price set equal to the market price of the company’s shares on the date of the grant (known as
an at-the-money option); vest and become exercisable over some period, typically three to
45
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companies consisted of a combination of restricted stock and options, and most
of that compensation took the form of options.50
While short-term bonuses were sometimes based on accounting performance
vis-à-vis that of peers and so included explicit RPE, this was rarely the case for
restricted stock grants and almost never the case for stock options.51 This was
not ideal. It was widely recognized that purely time-vested restricted stock and
conventional stock options rewarded executives for market rises even if firmspecific performance lagged the market and also exposed executives to market
risk over which they had no control. In other words, these pay instruments lacked
RPE. Holmstrom and other theorists had explained that the efficiency of pay
could be improved by factoring out market risk and focusing rewards more
closely on own-firm performance,52 and practice-oriented commentators
proposed a means for doing so: indexing the exercise price of options to the
market or to a basket of stocks including peer firms.53 But for a variety of tax
and accounting reasons, indexation of options did not happen.54 So by the year

five years following grant; are nontransferable; and expire after ten years. Walker, supra note
48, at 237. Time-vested restricted stock is typically awarded to an executive at no explicit
cost. Id. If the executive remains with her company through the vesting period, the stock
becomes owned outright. If the executive leaves prior to vesting, the stock must be returned.
The stock may not be transferred or hypothecated in the interim. Id. Restricted stock units
(“RSUs”) are economically identical but represent a promise to deliver stock on the vesting
date rather than an actual delivery of contingently owned stock. Id. Vesting details vary but
typically involve ratable vesting over a period of three to five years following grant. Id. I use
the term “restricted stock” in this Article to refer both to conventional restricted stock and
RSUs.
50
See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of
Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 633 (2011).
51
Level 3 Communications was one exception. In the 1990s, Level 3 adopted a stockoption plan that indexed option-exercise prices to variations in the S&P 500. See Joann S.
Lublin, Pay for Outperforming: James Crowe, Chief of Level 3 Communications, Makes the
Case for Linking Stock Options to Market-Beating Gains, WALL STREET J., Apr. 6, 2000, at
R8.
52
See Holmstrom, supra note 7, at 334-39.
53
See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 91, 93-97.
54
Prior to 2006, U.S. financial accounting rules strongly favored the use of conventional,
at-the-money stock options over other forms of pay. Companies were not required to
recognize any compensation expense for these options at any time. Indexed options, by
contrast, had to be expensed, and the expense had to be adjusted in each accounting period
for fluctuations in share price. See Walker, supra note 48, at 238. Although the accounting
rules for equity-based pay were rationalized beginning in 2006, § 409A of the Internal
Revenue Code, which was enacted in 2004, essentially precludes the issuance of indexed
options today by imposing a 20% penalty tax on the income arising from such options. See
id. at 239-40.
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2000, only a small fraction of U.S. public company executive pay included any
explicit RPE.55
To be sure, relative performance evaluation could have factored into
executive pay contracts implicitly. Increases in salary, bonus targets, and equity
grants might have been based, in part, on the prior year’s (or years’) performance
relative to peer firms. However, the evidence of implicit RPE in executive pay
contracts during this period is modest. For example, Rick Antle and Abbie Smith
examined executive pay at thirty-nine companies within three industries
between 1947 and 1977 and found only weak evidence of implicit RPE.56 Robert
Gibbons and Kevin Murphy analyzed CEO pay at over 1000 companies between
1974 and 1986 and found evidence that RPE was used implicitly in
compensation and retention decisions; however, they also found that
performance was more likely to be gauged relative to broad market movements
than to industry-specific performance.57 Writing in 2003, John Core, Wayne
Guay, and David Larcker concluded that there was little evidence that executive
bonuses included RPE.58
This situation changed dramatically in the early 2000s as performance awards
replaced stock options as the single largest element of most senior executive pay
packages.59 Performance awards include performance-based option plans and
long-term cash incentive plans that are performance based, but most
performance awards consist of performance shares.60 Performance shares are
essentially restricted stock grants that vest based on achievement of time and
performance hurdles. Typically, performance share plans cover three-year
performance periods and allow for the delivery of a variable number of shares
associated with threshold, target, and maximum achievement of performance

55

See Walker, supra note 43, at 405.
See Rick Antle & Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance
Evaluation of Corporate Executives, 24 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 3 (1986) (finding some evidence of
RPE at sixteen of thirty-nine companies and describing their results as “mixed”).
57
See Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief
Executive Officers, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 30-S, 38-S (1990). As
discussed supra Section II.A, benchmarking against broad market movements is less likely to
encourage competition than benchmarking against a select group of peer companies.
58
See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation
and Incentives: A Survey, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL. REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 38.
59
See Walker, supra note 43, at 405 (noting that performance-based equity pay increased
by 350% between 2001 and 2012).
60
See J. Carr Bettis et al., Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation,
66 J. ACCT. & ECON. 194, 197 (2018) (analyzing compensation at 1000 large companies and
finding that 97% of companies utilizing performance-based equity pay issued performance
shares while only 8% issued performance-based options). To be clear, performance-based
options are not options with indexed exercise prices but are options that vest on the
achievement of performance thresholds as well as time.
56
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goals.61 Beyond this, however, performance share design details vary widely.
Plans may include absolute (firm-specific) performance goals, relative
performance goals, or (increasingly) some combination of the two. 62 The goals
may be based on accounting results (e.g., earnings per share), market results
(e.g., total shareholder return),63 or other more idiosyncratic metrics (e.g., safety
performance).64 Where RPE is explicitly invoked, performance may be
measured relative to a broad market index (e.g., the S&P 500), an industryspecific index, or a select group of peer firms. 65
Performance awards now account for the majority of the long-term incentives
provided to U.S. public-company senior executives. In an analysis of 2017 CEO
compensation at the largest 300 U.S. public companies, executive pay
consultants Korn Ferry found that performance awards accounted for 55% of
long-term incentives at the median, with conventional options and time-vested
restricted stock each accounting for about 22.5%.66
The explicit use of RPE has mushroomed as companies have embraced
performance awards. Because performance awards can include multiple goals,
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact economic significance of RPE in executive
pay contracts, but the growth is unmistakable. Rebecca DeSimone finds that the
fraction of companies in the ISS Incentive Lab database that included explicit
RPE metrics in long-term compensation awards increased from less than 15%
during the height of the late 1990s/early 2000s option boom to over 50% by

61
See FW COOK, 2018 TOP 250 REPORT 17 (2018), https://www.fwcook.com/content
/documents/Publications/11-7-18_FWC_2018_Top_250_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5DZHPW4] (showing that 91% of surveyed companies reported measuring performance over a
three-year period). Although most plans provide for threshold, target, and maximum
performance targets, the number of shares delivered is generally a continuous function with
interpolation between these discrete targets. See Walker, supra note 43, at 412.
62
See Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 198.
63
Total shareholder return is the sum of share price appreciation and dividends paid per
share over some period, expressed as a percentage of share price at the beginning of the period.
Total Shareholder Return (TSR), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t
/tsr.asp [https://perma.cc/NC9W-2L8Y] (last updated June 25, 2019).
64
See Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 200.
65
See John Bizjak et al., The Role of Peer Firm Selection in Explicit Relative Performance
Awards 15 (Apr. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833309 [https://perma.cc/8VE3-TRZZ].
66
Press Release, Tracy Kurschner, Pub. Relations Manager, Korn Ferry, Cash Is Not
King—CEO Annual Pay Raises Hit New Low with Smallest Increase in 6 Years (May 4,
2017), https://ir.kornferry.com/news-releases/news-release-details/cash-not-king-ceo-annual
-pay-raises-hit-new-low-smallest [https://perma.cc/M8BB-VXS7]; see EQUILAR, EXECUTIVE
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLANS: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE TRENDS 8 (2017) (finding that 87% of
S&P 500 companies granted at least one performance award in 2015).
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2014.67 Similarly, executive pay consultant Equilar reports that the percentage
of S&P 500 companies issuing explicit RPE awards to their CEOs increased
from 42% to 57% between 2011 and 2015 alone.68
To be sure, some companies may adjust discretionary compensation based on
relative performance in addition to or instead of incorporating RPE explicitly
into equity pay instruments. But given the popularity of explicit RPE and the
push from proxy advisory firms and institutional investors for RPE described in
the next section, it seems likely that explicit RPE dominates implicit RPE in
today’s executive pay landscape.
C.

Why Did Companies Embrace Explicit RPE in the 2000s?

This Article is primarily concerned with the current widespread adoption of
RPE and its relationship with common ownership. Thus, to some extent, the
reason that companies adopted explicit RPE-based awards is irrelevant.
Nonetheless, a brief look at why companies embraced RPE may help us
understand the contours and likely persistence of today’s common pay practices.
While certainly not perfectly clear, the largest factor in the widespread
adoption of explicit RPE metrics in long-term executive pay arrangements was
likely the move away from stock options in the early 2000s.69 Encouraged by
tax and accounting preferences, U.S. public companies embraced stock options
as the primary long-term incentive pay vehicle in the 1990s.70 In theory, stock
options could have been designed to include RPE. The exercise price of options
could have been indexed to a measure of industry or market performance, such
that payouts would be based on firm-specific performance, but tax and
accounting rules effectively prevented companies from adopting indexed
options.71
However, reliance on options declined precipitously in the 2000s with the
burst of the dot-com bubble and the end to irrational exuberance and with the
2004 (effective 2006) revision of U.S. accounting rules to level the playing field
between options and other forms of compensation.72 In addition, stock options

67
See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 34. The ISS Incentive Lab database provides detailed
information on executive pay arrangements since 1998 at approximately 1200 of the largest
U.S. public companies. Id. at 15.
68
EQUILAR, supra note 66, at 8.
69
Walker, supra note 50, at 634-41 (discussing various factors influencing shift from
option to stock compensation).
70
As discussed supra note 48, prior to 2006, conventional compensatory stock options
bore no cost from an accounting perspective. Further, in 1992 Congress amended the tax rules
to deny deductions for senior executive pay in excess of $1 million per executive per year
except for certain performance-based pay. Stock options satisfied the performance-pay
exception. Walker, supra note 48, at 239.
71
See supra note 54.
72
See Walker, supra note 50, at 636, 639-41.
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took on a negative connotation in the wake of options-related scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco in the early 2000s and with the option backdating scandal
that followed a few years later.73 With options out of favor, companies turned to
other equity-based tools, including restricted stock, to provide medium- to longterm incentives. But restricted stock had its own credibility problem. By this
point, shareholder advocates and proxy advisory firms had thoroughly embraced
the position that executive pay should be linked closely with firm performance,
and conventional, time-vested restricted stock—sometimes derisively referred
to as “pay for pulse”—was not viewed as being sufficiently performance-based
for many stakeholders.74 However, performance-vesting conditions could be
added to restricted stock without triggering any adverse tax or accounting
consequences, and, of course, this is what companies did, increasingly,
beginning in the 2000s.75
To be sure, there was no inherent requirement that performance conditions
placed on restricted stock be relative performance conditions. The adoption of
absolute performance conditions may have been sufficient for many
stakeholders. But once performance conditions were dictated and the accounting
and tax obstacles to the adoption of RPE were eliminated, it is perhaps not
surprising that many companies would embrace RPE as consistent with
compensation theory and common sense.
An additional push for RPE came from two sources. First, the large
institutional investors (who are also the largest common owners and might be
expected to disfavor RPE if compensation is a mechanism for dampening
competition) at least superficially promoted relative evaluation.76 Second, the

73

See id. at 637-38.
See, e.g., Simon Patterson & David Bixby, Can RSUs Reduce Executive Pay
Complexity?, PEARL MEYER (Dec. 2017), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/knowledge-share
/ask-the-expert/can-rsus-reduce-executive-pay-complexity [https://perma.cc/L8SU-4ZPH]
(noting investors’ perception that time-vested restricted stock constitutes “paying for pulse”).
75
In addition, purely time-vested restricted stock did not satisfy the performance-based
pay exception to I.R.C. § 162(m) and thus was largely not deductible. Restricted stock with
performance-vesting conditions was generally fully deductible. See Walker, supra note 43, at
407.
76
BlackRock, for example, states that “[o]ur evaluation of equity compensation plans is
based on a company’s executive pay and performance relative to peers.” B LACKROCK, PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 11 (2019), https://www.blackrock.com
/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WGL-2AV2]. In determining how to vote on executive “say on pay”
proposals, Fidelity takes into account “[t]he alignment of executive compensation and
company performance relative to peers.” FIDELITY, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 6 (2019),
https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-ProxyVoting-Guidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-Advised-by-FMRCo-and-SelectCo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BE2N-RGYH]. Capital Group
74
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proxy advisory firms adopted executive pay guidelines that encouraged the use
of RPE. For example, in its discussion of its approach to executive compensation
analysis, proxy advisor Glass Lewis states: “[W]e believe executive
compensation should be closely tied not to absolute or overall performance but
rather to the company’s track record of performance relative to its peers.
Management should be especially rewarded for directing the company in a
manner that outperforms its peers.”77
Moreover, the proxy advisory firms have explicitly incorporated RPE in their
evaluation processes. Glass Lewis’s proprietary pay-for-performance model is
based on a comparison of executive compensation, total shareholder return,
earnings-per-share growth, change in operating cash flow, return on equity, and
return on assets at the target company and at a selected group of peer
companies.78
Similarly, the most influential proxy advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder
Services (“ISS”), employs several tools for evaluating the relationship between
executive pay and performance—three of which are based on relative
performance.79 For example, their Relative Degree of Alignment measure
determines a company’s percentile rank over a three-year period among a group
of peer firms for CEO pay and total shareholder return and then compares the
two percentiles.80 Executives are overpaid by this measure when their CEO pay
percentile exceeds their total shareholder return percentile.81 According to John
Bizjak, Swaminathan Kalpathy, Zhichuan Frank Li, and Brian Young,
compensation consultants report that companies often adopt explicit RPE-based
awards when ISS raises questions about the relationship between pay and
company performance.82

prefer[s] a significant portion of management’s compensation to come in the form of
equity stakes tied to long-term value creation for all shareholders. It is important,
however, that such compensation be designed not merely to reward a “rising tide” in
either the market or a specific industry that cannot be fairly attributed to management
skill or contribution.
Information on Capital Group’s Policies and Disclosures, CAPITAL GROUP,
https://www.capitalgroup.com/us/policies-and-disclosures.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
77
Understanding Our Compensation Analysis, GLASS LEWIS, https://web.archive.org/web
/20190226024258/http://www.glasslewis.com/understanding-our-compensation-analysis/
[https://perma.cc/N9H8-56P5] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (click “Pay-for-Performance
Analysis”).
78
See id.
79
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDERS SERVS., PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE MECHANICS 5-7 (2019),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/Pay-for-PerformanceMechanics.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4W5-PFYE] (specifically, Relative Degree of Alignment,
Multiples of Median, and Financial Performance Assessment).
80
See id. at 5-6.
81
See id. at 5.
82
See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 23 n.24.
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Avoidance of RPE Is Unlikely to Be a Mechanism by Which Common
Owners Discourage Interfirm Competition

It is well understood that the ownership of U.S. equities has become
increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors in general and
in the hands of index funds specifically. 83 Given the objective of owning the
market, it is not surprising that index investors have amassed large stakes in
multiple companies within an industry. To be sure, the significance of this
common ownership and even how it is best measured is controversial, 84 but by
any measure, the incidence and degree of common ownership has increased
significantly over the last twenty-five years.85
Undoubtedly less well recognized is the transformation of executive pay over
the same period—chiefly the replacement of options at many companies with
performance shares and the inclusion of explicit RPE metrics in many of these
awards.86 In an influential article, Elhauge suggests that increasing institutional
investor common ownership, which he calls horizontal shareholding, can help
explain the shift toward compensation schemes—principally stock options—
that reward executives for industry or market performance rather than for firmspecific performance alone.87 While this might have been an accurate
description of the executive pay landscape in the year 2000, this line of argument
ignores the dramatic increase in the use of explicit RPE metrics in executive pay
arrangements over the last twenty years, as documented above.88 It is simply no
longer true as an empirical matter.
The upshot, however, is that the major secular trends in share ownership and
executive pay design run exactly counter to the hypothesis that compensation
design might serve as a mechanism linking common ownership to reduced
interfirm competition. As displayed in Figure 1 below, both common ownership
and the use of explicit RPE have increased substantially over the last twenty to
twenty-five years—exactly opposite of what one would expect if common
owners were using compensation design to discourage (or not encourage)
competition.

83
84
85
86
87
88

See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
See Walker, supra note 43, at 396.
See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1278-81.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
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Figure 1. Increases in Company Common Ownership and Use of Explicit
RPE.89

This macro-level evidence is also inconsistent with the hypothesized passive
or “do nothing” mechanism proposed by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu.90 Recall that
the idea here is that, unlike an undiversified owner who might actively
encourage competition, a common owner might simply refrain from active
encouragement, in which case executives will tend to avoid taking personally
costly actions to compete and simply enjoy the quiet life.91 But adopting RPEbased compensation instruments is the opposite of doing nothing. Given the
potential to boost pay by outcompeting peer firms, it would be costly for RPEcompensated executives to refrain from competition.
Of course, this macro-level evidence is not conclusive. It is possible that while
the use of RPE is increasing generally among U.S. companies, companies in
89

Common ownership data is based on Liang, supra note 6, at 30, and represents the
fraction of ExecuComp companies that share at least one common blockholder with another
company in the same industry. Compustat’s ExecuComp database compiles senior executive
pay data from proxy statements of approximately 2200 of the largest U.S. public companies
each year. See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 10. RPE-use data is based on DeSimone, supra
note 6, at 34, and represents the fraction of ISS Incentive Lab companies that issue at least
one long-term performance award incorporating an RPE metric each year.
90
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3, at 1556-58.
91
See id.

2394

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2373

industries with high levels of common ownership avoid the use of RPE or design
RPE in such a way as to minimize incentives to compete. But, as discussed in
the following paragraphs, the evidence does not support these ideas either.
Let us begin with the latter idea—that RPE might be designed in such a way
as to create an appearance of performance measurement vis-à-vis peers (that
might satisfy the proxy advisory firms and other stakeholders) but to actually
avoid fostering intense competition.92 As noted above, choice of peer group is a
key RPE design issue.93 RPE may be based on a select group of peer companies,
on a preexisting industry-specific index, or on a broad market index.94 While the
use of a select peer group benchmark creates incentives to undermine peer
performance, this is not the case for RPE based on a broad market index. As
discussed above, undermining the performance of one’s direct competitors—by
taking market share or through other means—would have an insignificant effect
on relative company performance if company performance is gauged relative to
the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000 index.95 The impact of benchmarking against
an industry-specific index would be somewhere in between, likely depending on
the number of companies in the index.
So one way of incorporating RPE without encouraging intense competition
would be through selection of a broad market index as the “peer” group. Thus,
to the extent that commonly owned companies utilize explicit RPE, the
compensation-mechanism hypothesis would predict that these companies would
adopt broad market indices as benchmarks. However, while all three approaches
are observed in practice, the most common approach is to employ a select group
of peer firms, typically ten to twenty companies.96 Bizjak, Kalpathy, Li, and
Young find that of the 47% of ISS Incentive Lab companies that issued RPEbased awards in 2015, 60% employed a select group of peer firms, while 22%
employed a broad market index.97 The emphasis on select peer firm
benchmarking does not seem consistent with stifling competition.
This is not to suggest that encouraging or discouraging interfirm competition
is the sole or even primary concern in designing RPE-based incentives.
Benchmarking based on a broad market index performs a different economic
function than benchmarking based on direct peer performance. The former

92

To be sure, ISS and Glass Lewis gauge performance relative to a select peer group of
companies, but it seems likely that companies would get some credit for RPE based on a broad
market index. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
93
See supra Section II.A.
94
See supra text accompanying note 65.
95
See supra Section II.A.
96
Bizjak, Kalpathy, Li, and Young find that, for ISS Incentive Lab companies that use a
select peer group, the average (median) number of companies in the group is 16.6 (15) and
that the number of peers at the 25th and 75th percentiles are 11 and 20. See Bizjak et al., supra
note 65, at 15.
97
See id.

2019]

COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES

2395

approach filters out broad market movements—such as the run up in the entire
stock market during the early years of this decade—while the latter approach
filters out market trends and industry trends. Each has its advantages, but the
heavy use of select peer groups does not support the idea that pay design serves
as a mechanism for discouraging competition.
As discussed above, Schmalz argues that RPE-based compensation
encourages product market competition when performance is measured based
on company value creation, since such metrics encourage competition over
market share and output, but that RPE discourages competition when based on
margins, since margins are generally improved by restricting output.98 All else
equal, common owners would prefer their portfolio companies to restrict output
and push up prices. So it is feasible that companies might embrace RPE (and
satisfy the proxy advisory firms and other stakeholders) while selecting RPE
metrics that do not encourage fierce product market competition between
commonly owned peer firms.
Again, both types of RPE metrics are encountered in practice, but the most
common metric employed, by far, is total shareholder return—and this metric
falls squarely within the value creation/pro-competition camp. Bizjak, Kalpathy,
Li, and Young find that 88% of ISS Incentive Lab companies issuing RPE
awards in 2015 employed a total shareholder return metric.99 Again, heavy
reliance on total shareholder return metrics does not seem to be consistent with
discouraging competition through executive pay design.
Another possibility is that companies in industries with high levels of
common ownership shun RPE relative to companies in other industries or that
these companies tend to employ weaker or competition-dampening RPE
structures. This brings us to the empirical literature addressing the relationship
between common ownership and RPE use, which is considered in the next
section.
E.

A New Challenge to the Empirical Evidence on the Association Between
Common Ownership and the Use of RPE

The empirical evidence linking common ownership to reduced use of RPE is
actually relatively modest. To date, four working papers investigate the link
between common ownership and RPE, per se: the 2016 version of AEGS’s paper
(later revised to focus on the sensitivity of executive wealth to performance
rather than RPE)100 and papers by Rebecca DeSimone, Heung Jin Kwon, and
Max Liang.101 AEGS and Liang find a negative relationship between common
ownership and RPE, Kwon finds a positive relationship, and DeSimone finds no
evidence that executive compensation design is a mechanism used by common
98

See Schmalz, supra note 41.
See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 15.
100
See generally AEGS (2016), supra note 5; AEGS (2018), supra note 5.
101
See generally DeSimone, supra note 6; Kwon, supra note 6; Liang, supra note 6.
99

2396

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2373

owners to dampen competition.102 So one issue with the empirical evidence is
that the results of the few studies we have are mixed. Other problems are
methodological.
Like the Azar et al. airline and banking papers, several of these papers use the
MHHI to determine common-owner incentives.103 As noted above, this
methodology has been criticized extensively, and I will not repeat those
criticisms here.104 Instead, this Article highlights a separate and serious
methodological concern with the other side of the equation: the measurement of
executive incentives. In short, the primary empirical strategy employed in these
papers is appropriate for identifying implicit RPE but not explicit RPE. If, as I
argued above in Part II, explicit RPE dominates implicit RPE in modern
executive pay arrangements, this is a fatal analytical flaw.
Each of these papers uses ExecuComp’s total compensation variable
(“TDC1”) as the primary measure of executive compensation.105 AEGS’s
strategy is to determine the sensitivity of TDC1 to own-firm and to rival-firm
performance.106 They predict (and find) that where common ownership is high,
executives are paid relatively more for rival-firm performance and less for ownfirm performance.107 Liang’s strategy is similar.108 Kwon also uses TDC1 as his
primary compensation variable but estimates pay-for-performance
elasticities109—rather than sensitivities—and finds that greater common

102
See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 54; DeSimone, supra note 6, at 2; Kwon, supra note
6, at 34; Liang, supra note 6, at 25.
103
See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 14; Kwon, supra note 6, at 2. DeSimone recognizes
and discusses the limitations of the MHHI, but she employs it to demonstrate that the results
of AEGS (2016) and Kwon are not robust. See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 4. Liang employs
a 5% blockholder threshold in determining co-owned peers within three-digit SIC industries.
Liang employs a 5% blockholder threshold in determining co-owned peers within three-digit
SIC industries. See Liang, supra note 6, at 8-9.
104
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25; see also O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 23,
at 596-97; Patel, supra note 24, at 300-18. From a theoretical point of view, Rock and
Rubinfeld note that ISS makes no distinction between companies with high and low MHHI
in its guidelines favoring RPE and argue that this makes it unlikely that there would be
significant variation in the use of RPE based on the MHHI. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note
25, at 249-50.
105
See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 15; DeSimone, supra note 6, at 10; Kwon, supra
note 6, at 8-9, 42; Liang, supra note 6, at 9.
106
See AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 19-22, 57.
107
See id. at 32.
108
See Liang, supra note 6, at 1 (finding that CEO TDC1 is positively related to stock
price performance of industry peers with common blockholders).
109
See Kwon, supra note 6, at 8. Pay-for-performance elasticity refers to the percentage
change in compensation relative to a percentage change in firm value; sensitivity refers to the
dollar change in compensation relative to a dollar change in firm value. But see DeSimone,
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ownership is associated with greater use of RPE.110 DeSimone replicates each
of these approaches while making various methodological improvements and
finds no significant relationship between common ownership and use of RPE.111
ExecuComp variable TDC1 is a measure of aggregate compensation
delivered to a senior executive in a given year.112 It includes salary; annual
bonus; and long-term, non-equity compensation actually paid—but for the
largest portions of executive pay, that is, long-term equity compensation, TDC1
is an ex ante estimate.113 Conventional stock options are valued based on the
Black-Scholes-Merton (“BSM”) option-pricing formula, with certain
adjustments to reflect the idiosyncrasies of compensatory options.114 More
complex performance awards are valued using BSM or, more commonly, Monte
Carlo simulations.115
The use of TDC1 as a compensation measure and the strategy of determining
the sensitivity of TDC1 to own-firm and rival-firm performance are appropriate
for identifying implicit use of RPE but are inappropriate for analyzing explicit
RPE. Imagine first a compensation package consisting only of salary and a
discretionary cash bonus. Compensation might be awarded based on firmspecific performance only, or to some degree, upon relative performance. The
latter would constitute implicit RPE, and measuring the sensitivity of total
compensation awarded to own-firm performance and to rival-firm performance
would be a reasonable way to gauge the extent of the implicit use of RPE in
setting pay.
But now consider pay packages that consist primarily of long-term, equitybased pay. To simplify, let us suppose that compensation consists solely of a
conventional stock option or, alternatively, of a performance share grant where
the number of shares delivered is a function of three-year total shareholder return
relative to that of a dozen peer companies. TDC1 in each case would equal the
supra note 6, at 14 (criticizing Kwon’s use of elasticities from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives).
110
See Kwon, supra note 6, at 6.
111
See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 12-17.
112
Executive pay data collected in the ExecuComp database is based on proxy statement
disclosures, which generally include pay data for a public company’s CEO, CFO, and three
most highly compensated executives other than the CEO and CFO. The composition of this
senior executive group has varied slightly over time. See Walker, supra note 48, at 245-46.
113
See ExecuComp Data Definitions, WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., https://wrdswww.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/960/Execucomp_Data_Definitions.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019) (defining TDC1 as “[t]otal compensation comprised of the following: Salary,
Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options
Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total”).
114
Most significantly, an experience-based estimated holding period is used to value
compensatory options rather than the expiration period used in valuing tradable options. See
Walker, supra note 43, at 423.
115
See Bizjak et al., supra note 65, at 5 n.9.
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ex ante value of the grant. Regressing TDC1 against own-firm and rival-firm
performance would determine the implicit use of RPE in setting the size of these
equity grants but tells us nothing about their explicit RPE characteristics. In this
example, the explicit RPE characteristics would likely be much more important
in terms of incentive creation than variations in the size of the awards. The
relative total shareholder return award based on selected peer performance has
strong explicit RPE features, while the conventional stock option lacks explicit
RPE.
It is completely possible, in fact, that companies that adopt long-term pay
instruments incorporating strong, explicit RPE metrics might reduce the extent
to which they adjust discretionary bonuses or salary awards for relative company
performance. It is possible, in other words, that variations in implicit RPE
determined in this fashion might run opposite to variations in total explicit and
implicit RPE.116 At the least, there may be a tradeoff between identifying
implicit and explicit RPE. If so, a strategy focusing on implicit RPE might be
appropriate for analysis of data from the period in which explicit RPE was
generally lacking in U.S. executive pay but inappropriate for analysis of data
from the early 2000s on, when explicit RPE became central.
DeSimone recognizes that TDC1 incorporates only the ex ante value of
compensation and thus fails to fully reflect executive incentives. 117 Nonetheless,
she replicates (and improves upon) AEGS’s and Kwon’s approaches and finds
no relationship between common ownership and the use of RPE.118 DeSimone
goes on, however, to use ISS Incentive Lab data to test the relationship between
common ownership (employing still admittedly flawed methodology) and the
explicit use of RPE.119 She finds that the probability that a company utilizes an
explicit RPE-based award and a measure of the size of such awards are either
unrelated to or positively associated with the degree of common ownership
within an industry.120
In sum, the empirical evidence linking common ownership to reduced use of
RPE is weak at best, is subject to serious methodological criticism, and does not
support the claim that executive pay design is a mechanism for linking common
ownership to reduced competition between companies. Given the secular trends
116
AEGS and Kwon both note that they run alternative regressions using ExecuComp
variable TDC2 as the measure of compensation and that their results are unchanged. AEGS
(2016), supra note 5, at 31 n.5; Kwon, supra note 6, at 9 n.4. However, the only difference
between TDC1 and TDC2 is that the latter replaces ex ante option values with realized values.
TDC2 does not include the ex post value of performance shares, and the large majority of
explicit RPE awards are performance share awards. See ExecuComp Data Definitions, supra
note 113, at 48 (defining TDC2 as “[t]otal compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual +
Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Options Exercised”).
117
See DeSimone, supra note 6, at 12, 17-18.
118
See id. at 12.
119
See id. at 15.
120
See id. at 2, 21-23.
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of increasing common ownership and increasing reliance on explicit RPE in
executive pay contracts, as well as the particular design features of RPE-based
awards, the lack of strong RPE-based evidence supporting the compensation
mechanism is not surprising.
III. COMMON OWNERSHIP AND THE SENSITIVITY
OF EXECUTIVE WEALTH TO OWN-FIRM PERFORMANCE
AEGS have revised their empirical strategy in the most recent version of their
paper. Before, they investigated the association between common ownership and
the sensitivity of executive pay to own-firm and rival-firm performance;121 now,
they investigate the relationship between common ownership and the sensitivity
of executive wealth to own-firm performance.122 The reason for this change is
their recognition that annual “flow” compensation, even including long-term
elements, represents only a fraction of executive incentives. 123 They note that
executives’ vested and unvested stock and option holdings are generally more
significant than current pay in creating incentives, including incentives to
compete hard with rival firms.124 Their revised hypothesis is that greater
common ownership leads to less pressure to implement high-powered
incentives, as measured by the sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm
performance.125 Unfortunately, as described below, there are serious conceptual
and empirical difficulties with a wealth-sensitivity approach that cause it to be
less promising than an RPE-based approach.
A.

The Revised AEGS Approach in Detail

In the latest version of their working paper, AEGS employ various measures
of the sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm performance (“WPS”) as a
dependent variable and various measures of common ownership and other
controls as independent variables.126 In most specifications they find a
statistically significant negative association between WPS and the degree of
common ownership within an industry. 127 They also conduct a difference-indifferences analysis based on BlackRock’s 2009 acquisition of Barclays Global
Investors (“BGI”), which consolidated the ownership of two very large and
formerly distinct investment portfolios.128 Examining data for three years

121

AEGS (2016), supra note 5, at 5.
AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 3.
123
See id. at 3.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 2-3.
126
See id. at 22-24.
127
See id. at 22.
128
See id. at 25. In 2008, BlackRock was the sixth largest and BGI the largest global asset
manager. Table: The P&I/Watson Wyatt World 500, PENSIONS & INV. (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:00
122
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following the acquisition compared to three years prior, they find that, relative
to other industries, WPS declines when the common ownership within an
industry increases as a result of this consolidation.129 As a possible mechanism
for their findings, AEGS suggest:
The simplest mechanism is that the absence of a large active blockholder
(with a strong interest in the target firm and without interests in
competitors) is associated with reduced efforts to design high-powered
managerial incentives. In other words, common owners need not actively
design flat incentives; they may merely fail to design steep ones the way a
non-common owner would.130
B.

Concerns with the Revised AEGS Approach

It is certainly true that an executive’s incentives depend on her equity
portfolio as well as on current compensation instruments. And it is also true that
evidence of a negative association between WPS and common ownership is
consistent with evidence of a negative association between RPE and common
ownership.131 But the shift from an RPE-based approach to a WPS-based
approach in evaluating the relationship between common ownership and
executive incentives is troubling for several reasons.132
First, while it is also true that a low wealth-to-performance sensitivity would
tend to discourage (or more precisely, not encourage) executives to compete
hard with rival firms, a low WPS also discourages executives from working hard
generally or from taking steps to increase profitability through noncompetitive
channels, such as lobbying for more favorable industry-specific tax rules. The
idea that common owners would want to provide low-powered incentives in
order to discourage competition seems like tossing the baby out with the
bathwater and is certainly inconsistent with the stated objectives of the largest
institutional investors.133 Second, while companies clearly do manage executive
incentives through the use and design of annual bonus schemes and equity-based
pay, they largely lack the ability to fine-tune or adjust WPS in the short to
medium term.134 Thus, the results of AEGS’s BlackRock/BGI merger analysis

AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20091005/INTERACTIVE/910019997/table-the-p-iwatson-wyatt-world-500 [https://perma.cc/E9UQ-484G].
129
See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 27.
130
Id. at 4. AEGS do not directly test for the absence or presence of large, unconflicted
blockholders.
131
See id. at 3, 7.
132
Hemphill and Kahan raise several methodological issues related to the revised AEGS
paper. They note, for example, that AEGS ignore noninstitutional blockholders, which may
lead to errors in the MHHI calculation. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 19).
133
See infra Section III.B.1.
134
See infra Section III.B.2.
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are particularly difficult to square with the theory. 135 Third, the shift to a WPSbased approach presents methodological challenges that AEGS may not have
addressed—specifically, the challenges in determining WPS associated with
complex performance share awards incorporating multiple absolute and relative
performance metrics.136
1.

Low WPS Is Inconsistent with Common-Owner Preferences

First, while one can imagine that large common owners in concentrated
industries, such as the airline industry or banking sector,137 might prefer
collusion to competition and might prefer to avoid pay practices that encourage
fierce competition, it seems much less plausible that preferences for collusion
over competition would be so great that common owners would prefer weak
incentives to powerful incentives generally. Of course, that is not exactly the
claim. The claim is that common owners prefer and achieve marginally weaker
executive incentives than noncommon blockholders, all else equal.138 Even so,
it is unlikely that these preferences would be strong enough to translate into
statistically significant results. Reducing pay-for-performance incentives simply
seems too blunt an instrument for minimizing interfirm competition. At the same
time that investors would be reducing incentives for interfirm competition, they
would be reducing incentives for executives to work hard generally, including
in ways that would not shift profits away from competitors but would increase
overall industry profitability, such as through lobbying for tax or other
regulatory concessions. As Hemphill and Kahan suggest, “A wholesale dilution
of [executive] incentives makes sense, if at all, only for firms where the bulk of
managerial effort otherwise would be devoted to competition at the expense of
other [commonly owned] portfolio firms.” 139
This is the key difference between WPS and RPE, and the key reason that
WPS is a less plausible lever for managing executive incentives than RPE.
Strong WPS incentives with low RPE would encourage a focus on overall
profitability but not fierce competition with rival firms, whereas strong WPSand RPE-based incentives would encourage that competition.140 Common

135
136
137

See infra Section III.B.2.
See infra Section III.B.3.
See generally Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 3; Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note

3.
138

AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 1-4.
Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 21).
140
This statement is true assuming that a competition-inducing RPE metric, such as total
shareholder return, is utilized. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99. Of course, WPS and
RPE are likely to be correlated to some extent, and WPS might be viewed as a proxy for RPE,
but the point remains that RPE should be a more promising place to look for incentive
management than WPS.
139
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owners should strongly prefer the former over the latter and the former over
weak WPS incentives generally.
Moreover, the largest institutional investors—both the index fund families but
also other large institutional investors—claim that they care about and work to
achieve executive pay arrangements that encourage strong performance. The
proxy-voting guidelines of these investors uniformly stress the importance of
compensation programs that align the interests of executives with those of
shareholders and create an effective link between executive pay and
performance.141 Some investors state that they will not support pay arrangements
that insufficiently link pay with performance.142
Of course, one might object that the stated preferences of institutional
investors for strong incentives should be discounted as cheap talk. How likely is
it that institutional investors would publicly announce that they do not care about
executive pay or actually prefer weak incentives at commonly owned
companies, even if it were true? Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence
revealing how common owners vote on or otherwise influence executive pay,
but we do know that institutional investors are not totally passive on the
executive-pay front. Since 2011, U.S. public companies have been required to
hold a nonbinding shareholder vote on the acceptability of senior executive pay
at least once every three years.143 While a large majority of shareholders approve
most of these “say on pay” proposals,144 institutional investors not infrequently
141
See BLACKROCK, supra note 76, at 11 (“BlackRock supports equity plans that align the
economic interests of directors, managers, and other employees with those of shareholders.”);
CAPITAL GROUP, supra note 76 (“Compensation should create incentives for superior
investment returns and align management’s long-term interests with those of the
shareholders.”); FIDELITY, supra note 76, at 6 (“Fidelity generally will support proposals to
ratify executive compensation unless the compensation appears misaligned with shareholder
interests . . . .”); VANGUARD, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 12
(2019) (noting that “[a]lignment of pay and performance” is one category of considerations
in executive compensation decisions and that “[i]n general, a fund . . . will support [executive
compensation proposals] that enhance long-term shareholder value”); 2019 Proxy Voting and
Engagement Guidelines: North America (United States & Canada), ST. STREET GLOBAL
ADVISORS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2019-proxyvoting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (“[SSGA] believes executive
compensation plays a critical role in aligning executives interest with shareholder’s . . . [and]
support[s] management proposals on executive compensation where there is a strong
relationship between executive pay and performance over a five-year period.”).
142
See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 76, at 11 (stating intention to oppose executive pay
plans that exhibit a “pay-for performance disconnect”); V ANGUARD, supra note 141, at 12-13
(noting objectionable features of executive pay plans).
143
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
144
While between 1% and 3% of say-on-pay votes fail each year, that is, achieve less than
50% shareholder approval, in aggregate over 90% of individual say-on-pay votes have been
“yes” votes. SEMLER BROSSY, 2018 SAY ON PAY AND PROXY RESULTS 6 (2018),
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vote “no.” A recent study found that the median of the largest twenty-five
institutional investors voted “no” on say-on-pay proposals 8.2% of the time in
2016.145 The study also found a close correlation between the votes of many of
these investors and the recommendations of ISS and/or Glass Lewis, suggesting
that the emphasis of the proxy advisory firms on pay for performance translates
into say-on-pay voting by at least some large institutional investors that are
likely to be common owners.146 In addition, Jill Fisch, Darius Palia, and Steven
Solomon examined say-on-pay voting at S&P 1500 companies between 2011
and 2016 and found some evidence that the sensitivity of pay to company
performance has a statistically significant impact on voting outcomes.147 Of
course, none of this evidence establishes that institutional investors impose
discipline on pay practices with equal vigor at companies in industries with
heavy common ownership. However, the point holds that the adoption of weak
incentives generally would seem to run counter to interest, particularly as
contrasted with the adoption of strong WPS incentives with little or no RPE.
2.

Executive WPS Is Difficult to Adjust over the Short to Medium Term

Perhaps because it is difficult to envision common owners actively advocating
for weak incentives, AEGS suggest that their results may be explained by
common owners remaining passive while blockholders in industries that lack
heavy common ownership aggressively pursue high-powered incentives. 148
They do not directly test for the presence or absence of large, unconflicted
blockholders, but this proposed mechanism is consistent with both their primary
findings and the findings of an analysis of a natural experiment. 149 In 2009,
BlackRock acquired BGI, combining the investment portfolios of the sixth
largest (BlackRock) and the largest (BGI) asset managers at the time and
increasing the amount of common ownership within a number of industries. 150
AEGS’s difference-in-differences analysis compares executive WPS in
industries that experienced a large increase in common ownership as a result of

https://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2018-SOP-Report-06-062018.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4VS-VK8E] (detailing say-on-pay voting results at Russell 3000
companies from 2011 through 2018).
145
MICHAEL KEEBAUGH, KELLY MALAFIS & ROBERT MARTIN, CAPFLASH: INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER VOTING PRACTICES FOR SAY ON PAY 1 (2016), https://www.capartners.com
/wp-content/uploads/news/id317/capartners.com-capflash-issue92.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/QC2S-GEV3]. The institutional shareholder at the twenty-fifth percentile voted no 4.3% of
the time and the shareholder at the seventy-fifth percentile voted no 11.7% of the time. Id.
146
Id.
147
See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay?
The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 103 (2018).
148
See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 4.
149
See id. at 27.
150
Table: The P&I/Watson Wyatt World 500, supra note 128.
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the BlackRock/BGI merger with WPS in industries in which common ownership
was less affected by the merger. They find that, in industries more greatly
affected by the merger, WPS was relatively lower in the three years following
the merger, suggesting that common ownership levels affect pay design. 151
There are two possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations for the
BlackRock/BGI results: First, companies in industries that experienced large
increases in common ownership might have reduced executive WPS while WPS
in other industries remained unchanged. Second, these companies might have
maintained current levels of WPS while companies in other industries increased
WPS. The latter explanation is consistent with AEGS’s suggested mechanism,
but neither explanation seems likely, particularly given the three-year period of
analysis pre- and post-merger.
It will be helpful to consider how companies actually create and manage
wealth-based executive incentives. It will be readily apparent that while
companies undoubtedly manage these incentives over the long term, they make
little effort and have little scope to do so over the short to medium term.
WPS is primarily a function of shares and options held by an executive,
including equity held contingently upon satisfaction of vesting conditions and
shares and options held outright. Thus, we can think of WPS arising from three
sources—current year compensation, outstanding equity awards from previous
years, and ownership of vested shares and options. The extent to which
companies can and do adjust WPS differs among these sources.
a.

Adjusting WPS Through Current Compensation

Companies could most readily adjust WPS by adjusting the terms of current
compensation. They could do so without affecting total pay by shifting
compensation between channels that are not sensitive to company performance
(i.e., salary) and channels that are sensitive (i.e., annual bonuses and equitybased pay). However, companies traditionally have not varied salary
significantly from year to year. We observe significant variation from year to
year in the type and amount of equity-based pay issued to executives (and thus
total pay), but we do not commonly observe tradeoffs between salary and equitybased pay. Companies could also adjust WPS by shortening or lengthening the
vesting periods—essentially the holding periods—for various equity awards, but
these vesting periods tend to be both uniform and sticky.
Let us begin by considering why companies do not tend to tweak the
allocation of pay between salary and performance-sensitive pay channels. One
reason is tax. In 1992, Congress limited the deduction for senior executive pay
to $1 million per executive per year, but created an exception for performancebased pay that was sufficiently broad so as to include properly designed annual

151

AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 27.
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bonuses and certain equity-based pay.152 But salary in excess of $1 million per
year was clearly not deductible, and for years many companies limited salaries
to $1 million to avoid delivering nondeductible compensation dollars. 153 On the
other hand, companies that paid senior executives salaries less than $1 million
per year prior to 1993 tended to raise salaries to reflect the new “cap.”154 So the
tax rule tended to create both a ceiling and a floor for senior executive salaries
and to inhibit variability.
Another reason that we may not observe tradeoffs between salary and equitybased pay is that these channels of compensation are thought to serve very
different purposes. Salary is generally viewed as providing basic financial
security, while equity-based pay is intended to incentivize risk taking, reward
success, and enhance retention.155 Whatever the reason, the empirical evidence
suggests that equity compensation grants are not fully offset by reductions in
base pay.156 So while companies could adjust the sensitivity of current
compensation to company performance year by year by shifting compensation
dollars between salary and equity-based pay, there is no evidence that they do
so. Of course, companies can and do adjust WPS when they increase or decrease
equity pay grants, but obviously this affects an executive’s total compensation
as well as WPS.
Companies also could adjust the WPS associated with current compensation
by changing the terms—most directly the vesting terms—of equity-based pay.

152

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107
Stat. 312, 469-70 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m)). Section 162(m) was amended by
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13211(a), 131 Stat. 2054,
2155-56 (codified at I.R.C. § 162(m)), to deny deductibility for all senior executive pay in
excess of $1 million per year, regardless of any performance linkage.
153
See, e.g., Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation
and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 456 (2001) (finding
reductions in salary and reduced salary growth at companies affected by § 162(m)).
154
See, e.g., David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit
Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT.
REV. 997, 1015 (2002) (finding that companies unaffected by § 162(m) limited increases in
CEO cash compensation in proportion to the extent that pay was expected to be below the $1
million benchmark).
155
See, e.g., Yale D. Tauber, A Perspective on Executive Compensation, in EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 1, 4 tbl.1-1 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002).
156
Matthias Benz, Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, Are Stock Options the Managers’
Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls 22 (Zurich Inst. for
Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 61, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=251009 [https://perma.cc/3DNC-5Q3M]; Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principles Do 6
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7604, 2000), https://www.nber.org
/papers/w7604.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRG7-Y6AZ].
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Most public companies make equity grants to executives on an annual basis.157
Given that executives often dispose of equity-based pay upon vesting,158 equitybased pay that vests in five years creates greater WPS than equity-based pay that
vests in three years.159 But again, we rarely observe year-to-year variation in the
vesting terms attached to equity-based pay. When options reigned supreme,
these instruments generally vested over a three- to five-year period and were
generally exercisable at the recipient’s discretion for up to a decade after
issuance.160 Today, performance share schemes dominate,161 but again the
vesting periods are relatively uniform and quite sticky. Most plans deliver shares
or the cash-equivalent after a three-year performance period.162 And again, we
rarely observe year-to-year variation in the length of the performance period. It
does not appear that companies tweak the vesting terms of equity-based pay to
adjust WPS.
Contrast the difficulty of adjusting WPS over the short term with the ease of
adjusting RPE. Given the complexity and heterogeneity of RPE-based
compensation, it would be unremarkable for a company to grant a performance
award in one year that incorporates strong RPE-based metrics and benchmarks,
and in a second year to select weaker RPE metrics and benchmarks or to replace
RPE metrics with absolute, i.e., firm-specific, metrics. This can be done without
making any tradeoff with salary or other pay that is not based on performance.
To be sure, most performance awards measure results over a three-year period,
but in the span of three years, a company could shift from strong RPE to no RPE
or vice versa, changes that would have little or no impact on WPS.163
157

In 2016, for example, 86% of the public-company senior executives whose
compensation is reported in the Compustat ExecuComp database received some form of
equity compensation grant (author’s calculation).
158
See Alex Edmans, Vivian W. Fang & Katharina A. Lewellen, Equity Vesting and
Investment, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2229, 2230 (2017) (noting that executive equity sales are
highly correlated with vesting).
159
Suppose, for example, that ACME issues its CEO 1000 shares of stock each year that
vest in three years and that the CEO immediately sells the vested shares. In steady state, the
CEO will hold 3000 unvested shares at any time. If the vesting period is increased to five
years, she will hold 5000 unvested shares at any time.
160
See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2485, 2507-10 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Cards eds., 1999). These option-vesting practices
remain prevalent today. See FW COOK, supra note 61, at 13 (stating that 97% of 250 largest
S&P 500 companies surveyed in 2018 reported that their option grants vested in three to five
years).
161
See supra Section II.B.
162
See FW COOK, supra note 61, at 17 (noting that 91% of surveyed companies reported
measurement period of three years).
163
Compare, for example, two performance awards that are each expected to result in a
CEO receiving 10,000 shares of stock after three years. One is based exclusively on firmspecific performance—no RPE—while the other includes only a single strong RPE-based
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Adjusting WPS Through Previously Issued Compensation

Short of dismissing executives prior to vesting, companies have essentially
no ability to adjust WPS associated with equity-based pay issued in prior years.
Once equity-based pay is issued, the vesting or holding periods, which largely
determine the WPS-based incentives, are either fixed (restricted stock and
performance shares) or are actually under the control of the executives
(options).164 Post-issuance, companies do not retain discretion over vesting or
exercise that might allow them to tweak WPS after the fact. To be sure, the
number of shares underlying performance share grants is generally variable, but
the targets are set at issuance and are not within a company’s control. 165
c.

Adjusting WPS Associated with Vested Stock

Moreover, companies do very little to control executive ownership of vested
shares, and to my knowledge they never cap executive ownership. To be sure,
many companies have share-ownership guidelines for senior executives, but
conventional wisdom suggests that these guidelines are rarely binding, either
because they are modest compared to executive compensation levels, are
satisfied by unvested equity pay, or are simply viewed as guidelines and not
enforced as strict requirements.166
*****
In sum, companies could manage WPS associated with current compensation
by making adjustments to compensation mix or the vesting terms of long-term
instruments, but they do not appear to make frequent changes in either.
Companies have little scope to manage WPS associated with issued and
unvested or vested equity. This is not to suggest that companies do not manage
executive WPS. Of course they do, but only in the way that one adjusts the
course of an oil tanker—very slowly.
As a result, it is difficult to fathom the idea that companies in industries with
large holdings by BlackRock and/or BGI either consciously reduced executive
WPS within three years of the acquisition in light of greater post-acquisition
metric. Since the executive is expected to receive 10,000 shares with either award, the WPS
created by the two awards is the same, while the RPE characteristics are obviously quite
different.
164
See supra notes 49 and 51.
165
Performance share plans with variable payouts linked to multiple performance targets
result in an economic relationship between share price and payout that is very similar to that
of an option. See Walker, supra note 43, at 413. AEGS’s description of their methods is not
sufficient to allow me to determine whether they take this “optionality” into account in
measuring WPS.
166
See Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and Reality, 90 IND. L.J.
353, 357 (2015) (discussing these limitations and finding that such policies are “extremely
ineffectual”).
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common ownership or failed to respond as companies in other industries took
steps to increase WPS.167 Setting aside the question of whether BlackRock, one
of the largest index-focused investors, would have an incentive to manage WPS
and interfirm competition,168 the companies in industries that became more
commonly owned after the BlackRock/BGI merger would have had no levers
with which to reduce WPS associated with outstanding equity awards and the
only means of reducing WPS associated with vested share holdings would have
been to soften shareholding guidelines allowing executives to sell more shares,
which, given the optics, seems unlikely. 169 As a result, any reduction in WPS
would have to have been achieved through adjustments to current compensation
grants and, given the relatively short period of study, through reducing the size
of equity grants rather than through shortening vesting periods.
Alternatively, companies in industries that became more commonly owned
might have maintained WPS while companies in other industries increased
WPS. But why would the BlackRock/BGI merger prompt an increase in WPS
in industries unaffected or less affected by the merger? Of course, the timing
might have been coincidental, but again, even if the companies in these other
industries purposefully set out to increase WPS, the tools with which they could
do so in a three-year period would be quite limited.
AEGS suggest that the absence of a large active blockholder without an
interest in competing companies is the simplest mechanism explaining their
findings.170 But in order to explain the results of the BlackRock/BGI difference
in differences analysis, one would have to assume either the entry of new
unconflicted blockholders into the industries that were less affected by the
merger, or that existing unconflicted blockholders in these industries for some
reason became more aggressive in managing WPS after the BlackRock/BGI
merger. Otherwise, one must assume that companies in industries that became
more heavily commonly owned actually reduced WPS. Neither explanation
seems likely.

167
Cf. AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 25-28 (finding evidence consistent with either or
both phenomena).
168
See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 40); supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
169
Such a move might also have been irrelevant as executive share ownership guidelines
generally are not binding. See Shilon, supra note 166, at 357.
170
See AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 4 (“The simplest mechanism is that the absence of
a large active blockholder (with a strong interest in the target firm and without interests in
competitors) is associated with reduced efforts to design high-powered managerial incentives.
In other words, common owners need not actively design flat incentives; they may merely fail
to design steep ones the way a non-common owner would.”).
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Methodological Concerns with a WPS-Based Assessment of Incentives

In their revised draft paper, AEGS rely upon the sensitivity of executive
wealth to own-firm performance to determine the strength of incentives in both
their panel regressions and their difference-in-differences analysis of
BlackRock’s acquisition of BGI. Doing so, of course, requires calculation of
WPS associated with shares owned outright as well as outstanding equity pay
grants. Calculating WPS for complex, performance-based equity pay awards is
exceptionally challenging, however, and it is unclear how AEGS have dealt with
this task. It is difficult to have confidence in their empirical results without
having confidence in this fundamental element of the analysis. 171
AEGS say very little in their paper with respect to calculation of WPS. They
note that they follow the approach utilized by Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, and
Augustin Landier in a 2008 article.172 Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier provide a
detailed description of how they determined WPS, which is based on earlier
work by Core and Guay.173 The basic idea is this: wealth associated with a share
of stock held outright or with time-vested restricted stock, assuming that the
shares ultimately vest, increases or decreases dollar for dollar with the
company’s share price, but the value of an option and wealth associated with an

171

A second, perhaps less significant, concern with AEGS’s revised WPS-based approach
is limited to their difference-in-differences analysis. There appears to be an at least equally
plausible explanation for AEGS’s finding of a relative reduction in WPS in more heavily
commonly owned industries following BlackRock’s acquisition of BGI that does not
necessarily support their hypothesis. Suppose that, relative to BGI, BlackRock more
aggressively pursued reductions in or limitations on executive pay. In fact, the most plausible
mechanism for a post-merger reduction in WPS would be reduction in current year equity
pay. Given the stickiness of salary and annual bonuses, it is likely that reductions in equity
pay would not have been made up elsewhere. If BlackRock pushed harder on equity pay at
companies in which it had a larger ownership position post-merger, reductions in current
equity pay would translate into reduced WPS in each of AEGS’s three WPS specifications,
assuming that other elements of pay were unaffected. To be sure, one might also be surprised
to learn that BlackRock aggressively monitors executive pay, see, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst,
supra note 14 (manuscript at 47-48) (providing evidence that index fund managers tend to be
deferential to management), but this idea seems at least as plausible as the idea that they
monitor WPS in order to discourage interfirm competition. And, of course, if the postBlackRock/BGI merger evidence is about pay levels and not incentives, this evidence would
not necessarily support the thesis that executive incentives are a mechanism linking common
ownership with reduced competition.
172
AEGS (2018), supra note 5, at 22 (citing Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Augustin
Landier, A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 4881, 4881-917 (1990)).
173
See Edmans, Gabaix & Landier, supra note 172, at 4898 app. B (citing John Core &
Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their
Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613, 613-630 (2002)).
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option is related to share price in a more complex, nonlinear fashion.174
Economists use the term “delta” to describe the change in the value of a
compensation instrument arising from a small change in the underlying share
price. Restricted stock and stock held outright have a delta of one; options have
a delta of less than one that depends on the current market price and volatility of
the shares, the option exercise price, remaining time to expiration, etc. Although
complex, option delta—like option value—can be easily estimated using the
BSM methodology.175 The sum of the delta-weighted shares and options held by
an executive is the key input into determining WPS.176
But what about performance shares? Performance shares were rare when Core
and Guay published their work in 2002 and had only recently become important
at the end of the period studied by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier. 177 Neither of
these articles discusses performance shares. Both articles focus exclusively on
stock (deemed to be time-vested only by implication) and conventional
compensatory options.178 But unlike time-vested restricted stock, performance
shares do not have delta equal to one.179 And, of course, performance shares now
dominate the equity pay landscape.
Like determining value, determining the incentive characteristics of
performance share grants is exceptionally complex. The complexity arises from
the variable award schedule that is a function of absolute or relative performance
(or both) with respect to market, accounting, or other measures.180 Moreover,
while companies are required to disclose an ex ante value for these awards, they
are not required to disclose their incentive characteristics.
The difficulty of determining incentive characteristics is multiplied when
awards are based on multiple metrics, which is increasingly the case.
Recognizing these challenges, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy elect to
analyze the value and incentive characteristics of a limited subset of
performance awards that include only a single, absolute performance metric. 181
Even for this restricted sample of grants, they find it necessary to develop new
simulation methods to study these awards. Having done so, they find that the
addition of performance-vesting conditions amplifies incentives to increase
shareholder value (i.e., increases compensation delta) versus purely time-vested
restricted stock.182 Although they limit their analysis to single, absolute metric

174

See Walker, supra note 48, at 237.
Id. at 237-38.
176
Edmans, Gabaix & Landier, supra note 172, at 4898.
177
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier analyzed data for the 1992-2006 period. Id. at 4899.
178
Core and Guay’s 2002 article only addresses the determination of value and incentive
properties of options. See Core & Guay, supra note 173, at 613.
179
Bettis et al., supra note 60, at 197.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 200, 211.
182
Id. at 212.
175
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awards, there is no reason to think that the outcome would be directionally
different for more complex award types.
The upshot is that the WPS associated with performance shares is likely to be
significantly different, and likely greater, than that associated with time-vested
restricted stock, but the impact is a function of the metrics and benchmarks
employed. In cases in which companies employ a combination of absolute and
relative performance metrics, it will be exceptionally challenging to determine
the delta and WPS associated with these grants.
If AEGS apply delta of one to all stock grants, whether time-vested alone or
performance-vested, it is likely that they will have misestimated WPS associated
with performance shares. Such misestimation is likely to be particularly
significant for recent periods, including the years surrounding the
BlackRock/BGI merger, in which performance share awards have been
prevalent.
IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
For the reasons discussed above, it seems unlikely that a negative causal
relationship exists between institutional investor common ownership within an
industry and the strength of executive incentives. Unfortunately, the empirical
strategies used to date have not been sufficient to establish the presence of such
an association or the lack thereof. This is an important gap since executive
incentives are generally viewed as one of the more plausible mechanisms
underpinning the broader claim of a link between common ownership and
reduced competition. In the spirit of advancing the empirical analyses and
resolving this important question, this Part offers some suggestions with respect
to the executive-incentive side of the equation.
First, tests for a link between common ownership and executive incentives
based on RPE seem more promising than tests based on WPS from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective. From a theoretical perspective, it makes
more sense that common owners would favor strong performance-based
incentives that lack RPE than weak incentives generally. 183 Generally, weak
incentives are simply too blunt an instrument for deterring competition. Also, it
is easier to adjust RPE than WPS over the short or medium term. Given all of
this, one would think that an empirical strategy focusing on RPE would be more
likely to produce an association between common ownership levels and
executive incentives, if an association is to be found.
But both approaches present empirical challenges. For RPE-based
approaches, there is the problem that RPE can be implicit, explicit, or both. An
improved empirical methodology must account for both implicit and explicit
RPE. As discussed above, determining the sensitivity of total compensation to
own-firm and rival-firm performance is an appropriate means of gauging
183

See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 28 (manuscript at 21-22) (reaching same
conclusion).
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implicit RPE, but explicit RPE likely dominates in recent years, and it is difficult
to quantify the economic magnitude of explicit RPE features of equity awards. 184
DeSimone tests for a relationship between common ownership and firm use of
explicit RPE, defined as any RPE-based award granted in a firm-year, and the
relative size of RPE grants, measured as the grant-date value of awards that
include RPE metrics as a fraction of the grant-date value of all long-term
incentive awards.185 This is a good start, but even the latter measure is only a
rough proxy for the incentive effects of RPE awards (and, of course, only
accounts for explicit RPE). The RPE feature or features of a particular award
can be central or they can be trivial. In addition to the relative size of awards, an
improved approach could take into account available data (from ISS Incentive
Lab) on the following features:
(1) the number of RPE and non-RPE metrics in a particular award. An award
with RPE metrics exclusively is likely to provide stronger RPE than an award
that includes one or more absolute (non-RPE) metrics.
(2) the nature of the RPE metric. As Schmalz notes, metrics based on
company value, such as total shareholder return, create incentives to compete
for market share, while metrics that are based on margins likely discourage such
competition.186
(3) the benchmark. Benchmarking RPE against a select group of peer firms
provides the strongest incentive to compete. The use of an industry index
provides a weaker incentive to compete. The use of a broad market index likely
produces no additional incentive to compete with peer firms (relative to an award
lacking RPE).
While an RPE-based empirical strategy seems clearly preferable to a WPSbased strategy, researchers should not completely ignore WPS. Imagine two
executives with similar RPE-based incentives, but one has much larger share
and option holdings, leading to much larger WPS. All else equal, the executive
with large WPS will have a greater incentive to compete with rival firms (or do
other things to increase share value). As such, WPS should at least serve as a
control variable in the analysis. As noted above, determining WPS for
performance awards is not trivial. Some rule of thumb may have to be developed
to estimate WPS for these awards. Hopefully, however, this problem will be less
acute if WPS serves as a control rather than as the dependent variable.
CONCLUSION
Given the seemingly inexorable rise in institutional investor ownership of
U.S. equity securities and common ownership, the influence of common owners
on competition is quickly becoming one of the most important topics in
184
185
186

See supra Part II.
DeSimone, supra note 6, at 20-23.
See Schmalz, supra note 41, at slide 63.
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corporate governance and regulation. The seriousness of the problem and the
advisability of intervention is a matter of heated debate. A key question in this
debate involves the mechanism that could translate anticompetitive incentives
of common owners into anticompetitive behavior by corporate managers.
Without a plausible mechanism, the arguments of proponents of regulatory
intervention lose much of their force.
Executive pay design has been a leading candidate for that mechanism. As
this Article has detailed, however, the evidence linking executive incentives with
common ownership is actually quite weak. The macro-level trends in the use of
explicit RPE and common ownership and the most commonly employed RPE
design features run exactly counter to the mechanism hypothesis. And now,
particularly given that AEGS have moved away from an RPE-based approach,
the weight of the remaining empirical evidence does not support the suggestion
that avoidance of RPE is a mechanism linking common ownership with
diminished interfirm competition.
The dramatic increase in the explicit use of RPE-based compensation metrics
over the last twenty years undermines not only the compensation mechanism,
but also the passive or “do nothing” mechanism proposed by Azar, Schmalz, and
Tecu.187 The idea here is that, unlike sole owners, common owners might simply
do nothing to promote competition and allow managers to live the quiet life.
Adopting RPE-based compensation, however, is exactly the opposite of doing
nothing.
The related but slightly different idea that greater common ownership leads
to reduced sensitivity of executive wealth to own-firm performance—that is, to
lower-powered incentives generally—and thus to dampening interfirm
competition seems implausibly overbroad. Moreover, this Article has offered
several conceptual and methodological reasons to question the evidence offered
by the sole paper adopting this approach to date.188
In sum, this Article has provided numerous reasons to conclude that executive
pay design is an implausible mechanism linking common ownership with
dampened competition. If accepted, these arguments tend to undermine the more
general claim and add further cautionary notes to the debate regarding regulatory
intervention.
However, this Article certainly does not purport to disprove the compensation
hypothesis; instead, it claims that the existing evidence is weaker than is
generally understood. As such, and despite skepticism regarding the hypothesis,
this Article has also offered several suggestions for improving the compensation
side of empirical analyses investigating the potential link between common
ownership and executive incentives. My hope is that these suggestions will help
analysts advance our understanding of this important issue.

187
188

See supra text accompanying note 32.
See generally AEGS (2018), supra note 5.

